Self-referential justifications in epistemic logic
From MaRDI portal
Publication:987374
DOI10.1007/S00224-009-9209-3zbMATH Open1216.03037OpenAlexW2146770397MaRDI QIDQ987374FDOQ987374
Authors: Roman Kuznets
Publication date: 13 August 2010
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://boris.unibe.ch/37192/1/224_2009_Article_9209.pdf
Recommendations
Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Explicit provability and constructive semantics
- The logic of proofs, semantically
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evidence Reconstruction of Epistemic Modal Logic S5
- The logic of justification
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Self-reference and modal logic
- Making knowledge explicit: how hard it is
- On the complexity of the reflected logic of proofs
- Self-referentiality of Justified Knowledge
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Active agents
- Sequent Calculi for Normal Modal Propositional Logics
- Gentzen systems for modal logic
Cited In (16)
- The logic of justified belief, explicit knowledge, and conclusive evidence
- Self-referentiality of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics
- Lower complexity bounds in justification logic
- Realization Theorems for Justification Logics: Full Modularity
- Languages with self-reference. II: Knowledge, belief, and modality
- Prehistoric graph in modal derivations and self-referentiality
- Prehistoric phenomena and self-referentiality
- Realizing public announcements by justifications
- Justifications for common knowledge
- Realization for justification logics via nested sequents: modularity through embedding
- Two Ways to Common Knowledge
- Self-referentiality in the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov Semantics of Intuitionistic Logic
- Self-referentiality of Justified Knowledge
- Self-enforcing Agreements and Forward Induction Reasoning
- Special issue on methods for investigating self-referential truth
- On non-self-referential fragments of modal logics
This page was built for publication: Self-referential justifications in epistemic logic
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q987374)