Randomization and the limit points of monopolistic competition

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)90006-XMaRDI QIDQ1330865zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Beth Allen

Publication date 10 August 1994

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90006-x

zbMATH Keywords

competitive equilibrialimits of Nash-Cournot equilibriamonopolistic competitionmultiple Walrasian equilibriasequence of replica economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Review text

For a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition, the set of competitive equilibria and the set of limits of Nash-Cournot equilibria for a sequence of replica economies coincide generically. The key feature which makes every limit of monopolistic competition perfectly competitive is that random rather than deterministic selections from the equilibrium price correspondence are considered in the definition of firms' reaction functions when there are multiple Walrasian equilibria. An existence result for mixed strategy Nash-Cournot equilibria in finite economies is also given.

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Cited in

(10)

• Approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for a two-stage game of asset creation
• On the finiteness of the number of critical equilibria, with an application to random selections
• Monopolistic behaviors and general equilibrium: A generalization of Nikaido's work
• Real indeterminacy of equilibria and manipulability
• Indeterminacy of Cournot-Walras equilibrium with incomplete markets
• Generic regularity of differentiated product oligopolies
• Endogenous formation of security exchanges
• A new test for monopoly with limited cost data
• STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS
• Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies

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