Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power

DOI10.2307/2527218MaRDI QIDQ4375444zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steinar Holden, Hans Haller

Publication date 5 February 1998

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2527218

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingsuper-majority ratification rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Group preferences (91B10) Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Representing a democratic constituency in negotiations: delegation versus ratification
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
• Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?

Cited in

(8)

• Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining
• Alliances and negotiations
• A group bargaining solution
• A NOTE ON THE EXISTENCE OF RATIFIABLE ACTS
• Losing money to make money: the benefits of redistribution in collective bargaining in sports
• Group bargaining: a model of international treaty ratification
• Representing a democratic constituency in negotiations: delegation versus ratification
• Contract adjustment under uncertainty

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