Real analysis in paraconsistent logic

DOI10.1007/S10992-011-9210-6MaRDI QIDQ692184zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maarten McKubre-Jordens, Zach Weber

Publication date 4 December 2012

Published in Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9210-6

zbMATH Keywords

compactness theorems Curry's paradox Heine-Borel theorem nonclassical mathematics paraconsistent logic real analysis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Paraconsistent logics (03B53) Foundations: limits and generalizations, elementary topology of the line (26A03)

Review text

A logic \(S\) is paraconsistent if it lacks the rule ECQ (``ex contradictione quodlibet, i.e., \(A,\lnot A\Rightarrow B\)) or, from another point of view, if inconsistent theories built upon \(S\) are not necessarily trivial (i.e., do not necessarily contain every well-formed formula). Paraconsistent mathematics is the development of mathematics in a paraconsistent logic, and so, the present article develops an analysis of the real line based upon a paraconsistent logic. This paper has a double aim. The first one is to show that it is possible ``to do everyday mathematics (p. 901) in a non-trivial inconsistent context; the second one is ``to explain in part a basic historical fact: the original calculus of Newton and Leibniz was inconsistent (p. 901). The main section of the paper is Section 4 (Compactness), as the main purpose of the authors is to prove compactness properties and, in particular, the Heine-Borel theorem. It is interesting to note that this theorem is proved by borrowing some strategies from \textit{constructive} analysis (of course, one cannot follow the classical proof paths in a paraconsistent context. Cf. Section 4.1). And, concerning this use of constructive ideas in a paraconsistent setting, the authors remark: ``Now, bridging the gap between nonclassical mathematics, combining techniques, has begun (p. 919). It is worth remarking Section 3.2, where a discussion on the possibility that inconsistency arises in the theory developed is introduced. The paper ends with Section 5 \ where some ideas for pursuing the investigation of real analysis from a paraconsistent point of view is presented. Although the authors ``do not make much of the logic per se (p. 902), I think that it is important to remark that the system used is a substructural weakening of Routley and Brady's logic DKQ: it lacks structural contraction as well as the operator contraction axiom \([(A\rightarrow B)\wedge (A\rightarrow C)]\rightarrow [A\rightarrow (B\wedge C)]\). The use of the restricted quantifiers in the development of the theory is to be noted too. The logic is briefly displayed in an appendix. \ A note on Curry's paradox is also included in this appendix, presenting a brief discussion on the question whether the system here developed gives rise to this paradox.

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