Recent developments in the mechanism design problem for scheduling

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-21204-8_3MaRDI QIDQ3004649zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Elias Koutsoupias

Publication date 3 June 2011

Published in Frontiers in Algorithmics and Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21204-8_3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Recommendations

• A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
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Cites work

• A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
• A Lower Bound of 1 + φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms
• Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
• Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
• Optimal lower bounds for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
• Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity

Cited in

(6)

• Efficient (re-)scheduling: an auction approach
• Randomized mechanism design for decentralized network scheduling
• Information extraction in scheduling problems with non-identical machines
• Incentive compatible, collaborative production scheduling with simple communication among distributed agents
• Non-monotonically rewarded job scheduling
• Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines

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