Replicator dynamics for stochastic games

DOI10.1007/S13235-025-00651-5MaRDI QIDQ6924426zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Divya Murali, K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao, A. J. Shaiju

Publication date 29 September 2025

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S13235-025-00651-5

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic stabilityevolutionarily stable strategyreplicator dynamicsstochastic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cited in

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