STRUCTURAL INTERVENTIONS IN NETWORKS

DOI10.1111/IERE.12639MaRDI QIDQ6203443zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 27 March 2024

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.12420

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43)

Abstract: Two types of interventions are commonly implemented in networks: characteristic intervention, which influences individuals' intrinsic incentives, and structural intervention, which targets the social links among individuals. In this paper we provide a general framework to evaluate the distinct equilibrium effects of both types of interventions. We identify a hidden equivalence between a structural intervention and an endogenously determined characteristic intervention. Compared with existing approaches in the literature, the perspective from such an equivalence provides several advantages in the analysis of interventions that target network structure. We present a wide range of applications of our theory, including identifying the most wanted criminal(s) in delinquent networks and targeting the key connector for isolated communities.

Recommendations

• Targeting Interventions in Networks
• Cost intervention in delinquent networks
• Multi-activity influence and intervention
• Targeted intervention in random graphs
• Graphon games: a statistical framework for network games and interventions

Cites work

• A model of weighted network formation
• A variational inequality framework for network games: existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis
• An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation
• Cascading failures in production networks
• Communication networks with endogenous link strength
• Cultural leader and the dynamics of assimilation
• Efficient networks in games with local complementarities
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2107836 (Why is no real title available?)
• Industrial policies in production networks
• Multi-activity influence and intervention
• Nestedness in networks: A theoretical model and some applications
• Network games under strategic complementarities
• On the private provision of public goods on networks
• Optimal contracting in networks
• Optimal pricing in networks with externalities
• Optimal targeting strategies in a network under complementarities
• Peer effects and social networks in education
• Peer effects in endogenous networks
• Peer effects with random assignment: Results for Dartmouth roommates
• Pricing in social networks
• Public goods in networks
• Social interactions and spillovers
• Targeting Interventions in Networks
• The network origins of aggregate fluctuations
• The role of cultural leaders in the transmission of preferences
• Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player

Cited in

(6)

• Cost intervention in delinquent networks
• Welfare and distributional effects of joint intervention in networks
• Pricing and information acquisition in networks
• Pricing negative externalities in social networks
• Sequential network design
• Network attrition: theory and policy implications

This page was built for publication: STRUCTURAL INTERVENTIONS IN NETWORKS

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6203443)