Secure applications of low-entropy keys

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The authors introduce the notion of key stretching, a mechanism to convert short \(s\)-bit keys into longer keys, such that the complexity required to brute-force search a \(s+t\)-bit keyspace is the same as the time required to brute-force search an \(s\)-bit key stretched by \(t\) bits. In Section 2 they describe a general framework for key-stretching algorithms. In Section 3 they describe various classes of attack that are possible on key-stretching algorithms, and some design principles that allow us to resist these attacks. In Section 4 they describe two different key stretching algorithms: one based on one-way hash function, and the other on a block cipher. They are able to give proofs, under some reasonable assumptions, that any attacks on the hash-based scheme translate into attacks on the underlying cryptographic primitive. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss extensions to frustrate brute-force attacks which make use of massively parallel devices. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0888.00019].











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