Security comments on the Hwang-Chen algebraic-code cryptosystem
\textit{T. Hwang} and \textit{Y. Chen} [Algebraic-code cryptosystem using random code chaining, IEEE Conference on Computer and Communication Systems (IEEE TENCON '90), 24-27 September 1990, Hong Kong, Vol. 1, 194-196 (1990)] have proposed a private-key cryptosystem that provides joint error correction, encryption, and ``message integrity. The scheme is based on algebraic error-correcting codes, using random chaining technique. In this paper, a chosen-plaintext attack is presented that is able to break the system, requiring \(O[(n-k) 2^{k/2}]\) ciphertexts and \(O[(n-k) 2^k]\) operations; the attack is based on obtaining a combinatorially equivalent code. Finally, a modified version of the scheme is proposed that overcomes the weaknesses of the original Hwang-Chen scheme; the complexity to break this modified scheme is \(O(k2^{n/2})\) ciphertexts and \(O(kn2^{n/2})\) operations. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0877.00018].
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