Simulation modeling of the resource allocation under economic corruption

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_10MaRDI QIDQ5057959zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kirill V. Kozlov, Anatoliĭ B. Usov, Mukharbeck Kh. Malsagov, Gennadiĭ A. Ugol'nitskiĭ

Publication date 1 December 2022

Published in Trends in Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_10

zbMATH Keywords

difference Stackelberg gameseconomic corruptionresource allocationsimulation modeling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• Corruption suppression models: the role of inspectors' moral level
• Dynamic models for coordinating private and public interests in economic corruption
• Game-theoretic model of corruption in hierarchic control systems
• Mean-field-game model of corruption
• Mechanisms of struggle with corruption in dynamic social and private interests coordination engine models
• Optimal Control of Nonlinear Processes
• Static models of struggle against corruption in hierarchical management systems

Cited in

(5)

• Simulation of resource allocation as games in a normal form
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2000127 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6755941 (Why is no real title available?)
• Social and private interests coordination engines in resource allocation: system compatibility, corruption, and regional development
• Simulation of Bribes and Consequences of Leniency Policy. Results from an Experimental Study

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