Social Indeterminacy
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- A generalization of Condorcet's jury theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters
- A law of large numbers for weighted majority
- Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society
- Condorcet's jury theorem in light of de Finetti's theorem. Majority-rule voting with correlated votes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5030410
Cited in
(24)- Boolean functions: influence, threshold and noise
- Maximally stable Gaussian partitions with discrete applications
- Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
- A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem.
- Robust optimality of Gaussian noise stability
- A law of large numbers for weighted plurality
- The instability of instability of centered distributions
- Gaussian bounds for noise correlation of functions
- The Condorcet paradox revisited
- Noise sensitivity and chaos in social choice theory
- Approximating the influence of monotone Boolean functions in \(O(\sqrt{n})\) query complexity
- Sharp thresholds for monotone non-Boolean functions and social choice theory
- Probabilistic view of voting, paradoxes, and manipulation
- Random Walks and Voting Theory
- Majority is stablest: discrete and SoS
- The Limit of the Non-dictatorship Index
- Construction of voting situations concordant with ranking patterns
- Conditional dichotomy of Boolean ordered promise CSPs
- An extension of McGarvey's theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism
- Conditional dichotomy of Boolean ordered promise CSPs
- Simple games with many effective voters
- A law of large numbers for weighted majority
- Noise stability of functions with low influences: invariance and optimality
- On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions
This page was built for publication: Social Indeterminacy
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5475054)
