Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2009.00542.XMaRDI QIDQ3655343zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Oren Sussman, Alexander Guembel

Publication date 7 January 2010

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00542.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

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Cited in

(7)

• Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt: the role of Seniority
• The Role of Multilateral Institutions in the Market for Sovereign Debt
• Sovereign debt and incentives to default with uninsurable risks
• Some curious properties of a familiar model of debt and default
• Sovereign borrowing, financial assistance, and debt repudiation
• On the sovereign debt paradox
• Crony capitalism and sovereign default

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