Coalition formation under limited communication (Q1194262)
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English | Coalition formation under limited communication |
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Coalition formation under limited communication (English)
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27 September 1992
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Given a finite set of players, we investigate coalition formation under restricted communication. One random ``call'' per player is allowed and coalitions form only after the calls, which unite subsets of players, one by one, are executed. This mechanism provides a simple model of bounded rationality. We characterize possible topologies of the induced communications networks. A cooperative game is defined on the set of coalitions admissible according to a call realization. Sch a game may have an empty core, but we demonstrate a restricted class of these games and a related communication game which have nonempty cores.
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coalition formation
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restricted communication
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bounded rationality
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induced communications networks
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communication game
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nonempty cores
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