Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium (Q694739)

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Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
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    Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium (English)
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    13 December 2012
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    This paper works on a concept derived from Maskin's definition of implementation. The new approach is developed by allowing for mixed equilibria as outcomes. A necessary condition for social choice correspondences implementation in the new sense, named set-monotonicity, is established. Set-monotonicity and no veto-power are, on the other way, sufficient to guarantee implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium, in environments with at least three players.
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    implementation
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    Maskin monotonicity
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    set-monotonicity
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    social choice correspondence
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    pure and mixed Nash equilibrium
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