The following pages link to Strategy-proof allotment rules (Q1367676):
Displayed 41 items.
- On recursive solutions to simple allocation problems (Q368058) (← links)
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient? (Q423715) (← links)
- The division problem with voluntary participation (Q427509) (← links)
- A revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems (Q430914) (← links)
- Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise (Q463398) (← links)
- Non-bossiness (Q682486) (← links)
- Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets (Q733774) (← links)
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods (Q836928) (← links)
- Secure implementation in allotment economies (Q844906) (← links)
- Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions (Q892978) (← links)
- Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources (Q900413) (← links)
- Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences (Q1038710) (← links)
- Rationing a commodity along fixed paths (Q1283854) (← links)
- Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy (Q1390978) (← links)
- Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped (Q1390979) (← links)
- Single-peaked preferences, endowments and population-monotonicity. (Q1605450) (← links)
- Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle (Q1611764) (← links)
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results (Q1697842) (← links)
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property (Q1753301) (← links)
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences (Q1876655) (← links)
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research (Q1982858) (← links)
- Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains (Q2138383) (← links)
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel (Q2179463) (← links)
- A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation (Q2212777) (← links)
- Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences (Q2230551) (← links)
- A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies (Q2254237) (← links)
- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked (Q2268911) (← links)
- Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities (Q2275660) (← links)
- Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria (Q2288520) (← links)
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals (Q2318132) (← links)
- Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences (Q2341129) (← links)
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences (Q2358563) (← links)
- Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints (Q2362197) (← links)
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents (Q2452129) (← links)
- Bribe-proof rules in the division problem (Q2462290) (← links)
- Strategy-proof and fair reallocation with single-peaked preferences (Q2673784) (← links)
- Menu mechanisms (Q2675411) (← links)
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof (Q6076917) (← links)
- On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions (Q6146443) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness in linear production economies with homothetic or quasi-linear preferences (Q6164133) (← links)
- Stable sharing (Q6176743) (← links)