Pages that link to "Item:Q1368881"

The following pages link to Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues (Q1368881):

Displaying 39 items.

• Matching with aggregate externalities (Q277295) (← links)
• The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q309845) (← links)
• Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search (Q456691) (← links)
• The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings (Q523460) (← links)
• Two-sided coalitional matchings (Q554501) (← links)
• The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model (Q617603) (← links)
• Unique stability in simple coalition formation games (Q705860) (← links)
• Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples (Q776971) (← links)
• Finding all stable matchings with couples (Q908185) (← links)
• Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples (Q975759) (← links)
• On coalition formation: durable coalition structures. (Q1398328) (← links)
• Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules. (Q1399521) (← links)
• Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle (Q1611764) (← links)
• Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market (Q1651852) (← links)
• Many-to-one matchings without substitutability (Q1668291) (← links)
• Constitutions and groups (Q1691356) (← links)
• Coalition formation games with separable preferences. (Q1810716) (← links)
• A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences (Q2034808) (← links)
• Preference aggregation for couples (Q2103590) (← links)
• Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment (Q2138086) (← links)
• Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities (Q2138371) (← links)
• Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories (Q2140313) (← links)
• Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching (Q2259423) (← links)
• Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching (Q2268127) (← links)
• Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching (Q2280043) (← links)
• A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues (Q2371150) (← links)
• School choice with neighbors (Q2425195) (← links)
• Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms (Q2427870) (← links)
• Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players (Q2452248) (← links)
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets (Q2455677) (← links)
• Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems (Q2629324) (← links)
• Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities (Q2638313) (← links)
• MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY (Q2854007) (← links)
• On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model^∗ (Q4531544) (← links)
• Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities (Q5013394) (← links)
• Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences (Q6188684) (← links)
• Matching with nonexclusive contracts (Q6555686) (← links)
• Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice (Q6631811) (← links)