The following pages link to Anat Lerner (Q1384020):
Displaying 8 items.
- A pie allocation among sharing groups (Q1384021) (← links)
- Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space (Q2290365) (← links)
- Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities (Q2346934) (← links)
- The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings (Q2351253) (← links)
- Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions (Q2822037) (← links)
- Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions (Q2867515) (← links)
- Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions (Q3459303) (← links)
- Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case (Q5283446) (← links)
