Pages that link to "Item:Q1804635"

The following pages link to Commitment and observability in games (Q1804635):

Displaying 50 items.

• Comparing human behavior models in repeated Stackelberg security games: an extended study (Q329050) (← links)
• Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games (Q417690) (← links)
• Ethics, welfare, and capital markets (Q485748) (← links)
• Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition (Q622107) (← links)
• Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion (Q633772) (← links)
• Noisy signaling: theory and experiment (Q645647) (← links)
• To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets (Q700115) (← links)
• A model of the origins of basic property rights (Q705870) (← links)
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs (Q705875) (← links)
• An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs (Q705876) (← links)
• Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs (Q785539) (← links)
• Noisy leadership: An experimental approach (Q863265) (← links)
• On `informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games (Q868625) (← links)
• Commitment in alternating offers bargaining (Q898750) (← links)
• The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly (Q926789) (← links)
• Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage (Q943881) (← links)
• Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance (Q975372) (← links)
• R\&D and endogenous asymmetries between firms (Q1046188) (← links)
• Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games (Q1268635) (← links)
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment (Q1378028) (← links)
• Reputation with noisy precommitment (Q1381963) (← links)
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result (Q1577956) (← links)
• Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring (Q1604516) (← links)
• Moral hazard and private monitoring (Q1604517) (← links)
• On sustaining cooperation without public observations (Q1604521) (← links)
• On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private (Q1604522) (← links)
• The impact of customer returns in a supply chain with a common retailer (Q1752180) (← links)
• Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. (Q1864818) (← links)
• Second mover disadvantages in a three-player Stackelberg game with private information (Q1977405) (← links)
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment (Q2074041) (← links)
• Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable? (Q2092768) (← links)
• The limit of targeting in networks (Q2138068) (← links)
• Relative performance evaluation and contract externalities (Q2267373) (← links)
• Strategic capability investments and competition for supply contracts (Q2275819) (← links)
• Securing infrastructure facilities: when does proactive defense help? (Q2292114) (← links)
• Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment (Q2308797) (← links)
• Plausible cooperation (Q2347768) (← links)
• Game Theory Explorer: software for the applied game theorist (Q2356171) (← links)
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment (Q2389297) (← links)
• Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result (Q2404219) (← links)
• From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence (Q2499521) (← links)
• Feigning ignorance for long-term gains (Q2685824) (← links)
• A NOTE ON BAGWELL'S PARADOX AND FORWARD INDUCTION IN THREE CLASSIC GAMES (Q2907967) (← links)
• STRATEGIC DELEGATION IN A STACKELBERG GAME WITH MULTIPLE STAGES (Q3166240) (← links)
• DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE (Q4521372) (← links)
• Costly Leader Games with a Probabilistically Non-Strategic Leader (Q5269940) (← links)
• Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment (Q6077277) (← links)
• A survey on bilevel optimization under uncertainty (Q6096565) (← links)
• An analysis of managerial delegation in a market with vertically-integrated producer owning an essential input monopolistically (Q6156339) (← links)
• Optimal sequential contests (Q6194364) (← links)