The following pages link to Joel Sobel (Q225008):
Displaying 28 items.
- A note on pre-play communication (Q523513) (← links)
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games (Q910349) (← links)
- (Q920855) (redirect page) (← links)
- On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games (Q920856) (← links)
- Fair allocations of a renewable resource (Q1136599) (← links)
- Proportional distribution schemes (Q1150295) (← links)
- On optimal distribution of output from a jointly owned resource (Q1158071) (← links)
- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games (Q1173868) (← links)
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior (Q1175961) (← links)
- Similarity of games with incomplete information (Q1177227) (← links)
- An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information (Q1178808) (← links)
- Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies (Q1178809) (← links)
- On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics (Q1201145) (← links)
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication (Q1312241) (← links)
- Internal correlation in repeated games (Q1814186) (← links)
- Economists' models of learning (Q1841181) (← links)
- min, max, and sum (Q1851231) (← links)
- Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games (Q1893206) (← links)
- Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements (Q1916280) (← links)
- ReGale: some memorable results (Q2389290) (← links)
- Tit for tat: foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings (Q2455658) (← links)
- A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity (Q2482675) (← links)
- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information (Q2639786) (← links)
- Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium (Q3012105) (← links)
- The Timing of Sales (Q3321789) (← links)
- Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist (Q3337146) (← links)
- On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical (Q3348673) (← links)
- (Q3354617) (← links)
