Pages that link to "Item:Q2345222"
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The following pages link to Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem (Q2345222):
Displaying 10 items.
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186) (← links)
- A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem (Q1741752) (← links)
- Social integration in two-sided matching markets (Q1800976) (← links)
- Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core (Q2068882) (← links)
- Preference aggregation for couples (Q2103590) (← links)
- Match making in complex social networks (Q2287682) (← links)
- The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs (Q2424240) (← links)
- Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets (Q4971365) (← links)
- Unique stable matchings (Q6176757) (← links)
- Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores (Q6494253) (← links)
