Pages that link to "Item:Q2638977"

The following pages link to Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium (Q2638977):

Displaying 50 items.

• Inventory sharing and coordination among \(n\) independent retailers (Q319153) (← links)
• AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I: Definition and properties (Q361808) (← links)
• Bargaining over incentive contracts (Q414377) (← links)
• Essential collections for equilibrium concepts (Q444128) (← links)
• On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Q458942) (← links)
• Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring (Q485763) (← links)
• Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information (Q497941) (← links)
• Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium (Q725060) (← links)
• Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games (Q738928) (← links)
• Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty (Q741580) (← links)
• A simple modal logic for belief revision (Q813420) (← links)
• Optimal prize allocations in group contests (Q826607) (← links)
• Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability (Q844918) (← links)
• Robust dynamic implementation (Q893413) (← links)
• Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game (Q899678) (← links)
• Efficient communication in the electronic mail game (Q932805) (← links)
• Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations (Q953686) (← links)
• Long persuasion games (Q960240) (← links)
• Mutually acceptable courses of action (Q1016329) (← links)
• Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism (Q1036595) (← links)
• Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games (Q1294030) (← links)
• Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games (Q1357399) (← links)
• Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees (Q1368873) (← links)
• Social learning in recurring games (Q1378019) (← links)
• Privately observed time horizons in repeated games (Q1593749) (← links)
• The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities (Q1616494) (← links)
• Equilibrium selection in multi-leader-follower games with vertical information (Q1688442) (← links)
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security (Q1729670) (← links)
• Exclusive intermediation in unobservable networks (Q1735768) (← links)
• Receiver's dilemma (Q1745660) (← links)
• Managing and reallocating inventory across two markets with local information (Q1754115) (← links)
• Price discrimination of buyers with identical preferences and collusion in a model of advertising (Q1876650) (← links)
• Perfect Bayesian implementation (Q1893789) (← links)
• On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria (Q1925660) (← links)
• Strategic analysis of influence peddling (Q1938831) (← links)
• Trimmed equilibrium (Q1939526) (← links)
• On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Q1996114) (← links)
• Mandatory disclosure and financial contagion (Q2025035) (← links)
• Information transmission and voting (Q2074046) (← links)
• Persuasion with costly precision (Q2074047) (← links)
• Reciprocity with uncertainty about others (Q2100641) (← links)
• Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence (Q2123185) (← links)
• The cry wolf effect in evacuation: a game-theoretic approach (Q2160064) (← links)
• On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities (Q2173107) (← links)
• Self-rejecting mechanisms (Q2178032) (← links)
• Consulting collusive experts (Q2195705) (← links)
• Bidding collusion without passive updating (Q2283135) (← links)
• Dynamic signaling games with quadratic criteria under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria (Q2307579) (← links)
• Evidence reading mechanisms (Q2325665) (← links)
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk (Q2373768) (← links)