The following pages link to Sequential Screening (Q2707933):
Displaying 50 items.
- Optimal sequential delegation (Q281407) (← links)
- Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract (Q290164) (← links)
- Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions (Q324169) (← links)
- Information provision before a contract is offered (Q485733) (← links)
- Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device (Q629327) (← links)
- Pre-sale information (Q654512) (← links)
- The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints (Q785532) (← links)
- Buyer-optimal extensionproof information (Q785542) (← links)
- When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions (Q899502) (← links)
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines (Q899681) (← links)
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design (Q900598) (← links)
- Optimal stopping with private information (Q900599) (← links)
- Revenue management by sequential screening (Q900601) (← links)
- Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach (Q900602) (← links)
- Dynamic revenue maximization: a continuous time approach (Q900603) (← links)
- Dynamic screening with limited commitment (Q900605) (← links)
- Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting (Q926783) (← links)
- Optimal speculative trade among large traders (Q934971) (← links)
- A dynamic model of supplier switching (Q992668) (← links)
- A model of advance selling with consumer heterogeneity and limited capacity (Q1654019) (← links)
- Optimality of sequential screening with multiple units and ex post participation constraints (Q1668225) (← links)
- Dynamic price discrimination with customer recognition (Q1674987) (← links)
- Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information (Q1677245) (← links)
- Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result (Q1682735) (← links)
- Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks (Q2013371) (← links)
- Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values (Q2013372) (← links)
- A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints (Q2025005) (← links)
- Partial refunds as a strategic price commitment device in advance selling in a service industry (Q2030674) (← links)
- Dynamic mechanism design on social networks (Q2078034) (← links)
- On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment (Q2150676) (← links)
- Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values (Q2155905) (← links)
- On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design (Q2155909) (← links)
- Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007) (Q2208639) (← links)
- Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search (Q2231387) (← links)
- A Markovian Stackelberg game approach for computing an optimal dynamic mechanism (Q2245712) (← links)
- Optimal crowdfunding design (Q2334128) (← links)
- Ex post information rents in sequential screening (Q2343401) (← links)
- Pessimistic information gathering (Q2347771) (← links)
- Convolution and composition of totally positive random variables in economics (Q2427849) (← links)
- Selling options (Q2455665) (← links)
- Product Line Design with Deliberation Costs: A Two-Stage Process (Q3121148) (← links)
- Procurement with Cost and Noncost Attributes: Cost-Sharing Mechanisms (Q5031628) (← links)
- Deals or No Deals: Contract Design for Online Advertising (Q5031634) (← links)
- On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design (Q5031660) (← links)
- Design of Incentive Programs for Optimal Medication Adherence in the Presence of Observable Consumption (Q5095170) (← links)
- Progressive participation (Q6059539) (← links)
- Computing a mechanism for a Bayesian and partially observable Markov approach (Q6069356) (← links)
- Advance selling of new products considering retailers’ learning (Q6077635) (← links)
- Nonlinear pricing, biased consumers, and regulatory policy (Q6100999) (← links)
- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities (Q6107368) (← links)
