The following pages link to (Q3430415):
Displaying 36 items.
- A Borda count for collective sentiment analysis (Q314431) (← links)
- Solving hard control problems in voting systems via integer programming (Q322433) (← links)
- Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations (Q323149) (← links)
- Computing minimal extending sets by relation-algebraic modeling and development (Q406434) (← links)
- Graph aggregation (Q514143) (← links)
- Voting and vagueness (Q516326) (← links)
- Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view (Q899165) (← links)
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour (Q1042332) (← links)
- Research in decision theory: A personal perspective (Q1056649) (← links)
- Mathematical programming formulations for the efficient solution of the \(k\)-sum approval voting problem (Q1651649) (← links)
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness (Q1682726) (← links)
- Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting (Q1945667) (← links)
- The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes (Q2125096) (← links)
- Deepest voting: a new way of electing (Q2127888) (← links)
- Majority-approval social choice (Q2165624) (← links)
- Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting (Q2171865) (← links)
- Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser (Q2329162) (← links)
- Piercing numbers in approval voting (Q2334834) (← links)
- Fair sharing under dichotomous preferences (Q2343801) (← links)
- Label ranking by learning pairwise preferences (Q2389690) (← links)
- Justified representation in approval-based committee voting (Q2397667) (← links)
- Qualified voting systems (Q2409717) (← links)
- Lifting integrity constraints in binary aggregation (Q2446586) (← links)
- Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections (Q2452140) (← links)
- On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations (Q2673693) (← links)
- Aggregation over Metric Spaces: Proposing and Voting in Elections, Budgeting, and Legislation (Q4989327) (← links)
- A METRIC PROCEDURE FOR CARDINAL PREFERENCES (Q5075646) (← links)
- (Q5230861) (← links)
- Peter C. Fishburn (1936--2021) (Q5918411) (← links)
- Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures (Q6064224) (← links)
- Justifying groups in multiwinner approval voting (Q6165554) (← links)
- Approval-based apportionment (Q6201936) (← links)
- The expressive power of voting rules (Q6549138) (← links)
- Recognizing distributed approval voting forms and correspondences (Q6573343) (← links)
- Group strategy-proof rules in multidimensional binary domains (Q6624501) (← links)
- Probabilistic models of profiles for voting by evaluation (Q6624515) (← links)
