The following pages link to Donald E. Campbell (Q345196):
Displaying 50 items.
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences (Q345198) (← links)
- Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power (Q370962) (← links)
- Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization (Q404767) (← links)
- Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain (Q498871) (← links)
- The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences (Q529745) (← links)
- Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda (Q531422) (← links)
- Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules (Q607476) (← links)
- Social choice trade-offs for an arbitrary measure: (Q672778) (← links)
- Can equity be purchased at the expense of efficiency? An axiomatic inquiry (Q750266) (← links)
- Enforcement of resource allocation mechanisms and second best industrial policy (Q760332) (← links)
- Social choice trade-off results for conditions on triples of alternatives (Q900250) (← links)
- A characterization of simple majority rule for restricted domains (Q902600) (← links)
- Maximal elements of weakly continuous relations (Q908823) (← links)
- Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle (Q918349) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and weighted voting (Q991312) (← links)
- Uniformly bounded information and social choice (Q1030168) (← links)
- (Q1066779) (redirect page) (← links)
- Impossibility theorems and infinite horizon planning (Q1066780) (← links)
- Revealed preference and demand correspondences (Q1079093) (← links)
- Social compromise and social metrics (Q1083992) (← links)
- Revealed social preference (Q1099761) (← links)
- Redistribution of wealth when knowledge is dispersed (Q1106711) (← links)
- Equilibrium and efficiency with property rights and local consumption externalities (Q1120440) (← links)
- Arrow's theorem for economic environments and effective social preferences (Q1124503) (← links)
- Quasitransitive social preference: Why some very large coalitions have very little power (Q1128229) (← links)
- Anonymity conditions in social choice theory (Q1141568) (← links)
- Some strategic properties of plurality and majority voting (Q1153828) (← links)
- On the derivation of majority rule (Q1162903) (← links)
- Public goods and Arrovian social choice (Q1196707) (← links)
- Quasitransitive intergenerational choice for economic environments (Q1198382) (← links)
- The Arrow and Plott independence conditions (Q1206341) (← links)
- Voting equilibrium in a simple tax model (Q1221699) (← links)
- Rationality from a computational standpoint (Q1249122) (← links)
- Democratic preference functions (Q1250008) (← links)
- Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates (Q1252142) (← links)
- Arrow's choice axiom (Q1327966) (← links)
- A foundation for Pareto aggregation (Q1339753) (← links)
- Relaxing Pareto optimality in economic environments (Q1361097) (← links)
- Asymptotic density and social choice trade-offs (Q1377460) (← links)
- Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof? (Q1396000) (← links)
- A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule (Q1411093) (← links)
- A simple characterization of majority rule (Q1571053) (← links)
- A trade-off result for preference revelation (Q1576476) (← links)
- Weak independence and veto power. (Q1606284) (← links)
- There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think (Q1758194) (← links)
- Nondictatorially independent pairs (Q1804571) (← links)
- Continuous-valued social choice (Q1815223) (← links)
- Wilson's theorem for economic environments and continuous social preferences (Q1825101) (← links)
- A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures (Q1852663) (← links)
- Lebesgue measure and social choice trade-offs (Q1893790) (← links)
