Pages that link to "Item:Q3468907"

The following pages link to Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (Q3468907):

Displaying 50 items.

• Order of limits in reputations (Q333475) (← links)
• Bounded memory and permanent reputations (Q392656) (← links)
• Limited records and reputation bubbles (Q402059) (← links)
• A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games (Q485767) (← links)
• A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels (Q535169) (← links)
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts (Q645669) (← links)
• Impermanent types and permanent reputations (Q665455) (← links)
• Continuous time vs. backward induction (Q672679) (← links)
• Induction and the Ramsey policy (Q673696) (← links)
• Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games (Q697948) (← links)
• Cooperation and bounded recall (Q804483) (← links)
• The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments (Q834876) (← links)
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring (Q894041) (← links)
• When is reputation bad? (Q932806) (← links)
• Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms (Q971893) (← links)
• On the size and structure of group cooperation (Q996366) (← links)
• Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information (Q1017056) (← links)
• Reputation and exogenous private learning (Q1017801) (← links)
• Learning and sophistication in coordination games (Q1047791) (← links)
• Imperfect equilibrium (Q1187862) (← links)
• One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify Stackelberg equilibrium (Q1196623) (← links)
• Competition on many fronts: A Stackelberg signaling equilibrium (Q1196652) (← links)
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice (Q1196656) (← links)
• When are nonanonymous players negligible? (Q1268593) (← links)
• Repeated implementation (Q1277094) (← links)
• Bargaining with imperfect commitment (Q1304008) (← links)
• Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games (Q1357399) (← links)
• Rationality and bounded rationality (Q1378010) (← links)
• Reputation with noisy precommitment (Q1381963) (← links)
• Switching costs in frequently repeated games. (Q1587637) (← links)
• Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach (Q1590682) (← links)
• Matching in the large: an experimental study (Q1651242) (← links)
• Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device (Q1668267) (← links)
• Pretending in dynamic games, alternative outcomes and application to electricity markets (Q1741201) (← links)
• Bounded memory and incomplete information (Q1753297) (← links)
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests (Q1779817) (← links)
• Commitment in first-price auctions (Q1798804) (← links)
• Reputation with observed actions (Q1814938) (← links)
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information (Q1818297) (← links)
• Games with espionage (Q1885430) (← links)
• An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow. (Q1885437) (← links)
• A theory of forward induction in finitely repeated games (Q1891348) (← links)
• Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria (Q1934164) (← links)
• Reputation from nested activities (Q1950352) (← links)
• Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games (Q2025018) (← links)
• A model of gradual information disclosure (Q2049479) (← links)
• Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games (Q2095262) (← links)
• Leading to efficient coordination: individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game (Q2100650) (← links)
• Reputation for playing mixed actions: a characterization theorem (Q2138082) (← links)
• Reputation and news suppression in the media industry (Q2206812) (← links)