Pages that link to "Item:Q3821889"
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The following pages link to The College Admissions Problem Revisited (Q3821889):
Displaying 33 items.
- A coloring property for stable allocations (Q274058) (← links)
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets (Q404743) (← links)
- A further note on the college admission game (Q662278) (← links)
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians (Q708883) (← links)
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory (Q908176) (← links)
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186) (← links)
- A unified approach to finding good stable matchings in the hospitals/residents setting (Q930917) (← links)
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP) (Q972135) (← links)
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference. (Q1414616) (← links)
- On the stable \(b\)-matching polytope. (Q1414822) (← links)
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods. (Q1415914) (← links)
- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings (Q1566906) (← links)
- Equivalences between two matching models: stability (Q1714490) (← links)
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (Q1926598) (← links)
- Graduate admission with financial support (Q1985735) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade (Q2108764) (← links)
- Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets (Q2121461) (← links)
- Decision-making with reference information (Q2154380) (← links)
- Entering classes in the college admissions model (Q2212783) (← links)
- Minimal envy and popular matchings (Q2242327) (← links)
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839) (← links)
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (Q2437848) (← links)
- Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism (Q2467483) (← links)
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules (Q2482680) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (Q2482681) (← links)
- Median stable matching for college admissions (Q2491093) (← links)
- Social coordination and network formation in bipartite networks (Q2688234) (← links)
- (Q5002769) (← links)
- Stability Representations of Many-to-One Matching Problems: An Integer Optimization Approach (Q5060805) (← links)
- Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
- (Q5381135) (← links)
- A binomial decision tree to manage <scp>yield‐uncertainty</scp> in <scp>multi‐round</scp> academic admissions processes (Q6077358) (← links)
- Balancing stability and efficiency in team formation as a generalized roommate problem (Q6078610) (← links)
