The following pages link to (Q3999327):
Displaying 50 items.
- Bilateral exchange and competitive equilibrium (Q255173) (← links)
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas (Q274410) (← links)
- Matching with aggregate externalities (Q277295) (← links)
- Median stable matchings in two-sided markets (Q290162) (← links)
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics (Q290170) (← links)
- Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries (Q308603) (← links)
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching (Q308609) (← links)
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q309845) (← links)
- A branch-and-price algorithm for stable workforce assignments with hierarchical skills (Q322747) (← links)
- An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q328558) (← links)
- Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept (Q328575) (← links)
- Stable matchings of teachers to schools (Q329714) (← links)
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801) (← links)
- An analysis of the German university admissions system (Q361830) (← links)
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles (Q372362) (← links)
- Analysis of stochastic matching markets (Q378330) (← links)
- Local and global consistency properties for student placement (Q386062) (← links)
- Stable marriages and search frictions (Q402071) (← links)
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems (Q403704) (← links)
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets (Q404743) (← links)
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds (Q406428) (← links)
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker (Q417692) (← links)
- Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules (Q417718) (← links)
- Assignment markets that are uniquely determined by their core (Q421564) (← links)
- Testing substitutability (Q423737) (← links)
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action (Q423742) (← links)
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare (Q423772) (← links)
- Let them cheat! (Q423773) (← links)
- Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity (Q427512) (← links)
- Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game (Q430896) (← links)
- Optimal marriage Fitting for imperfect statistics (Q430963) (← links)
- Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress (Q431223) (← links)
- Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences (Q433155) (← links)
- The pairwise egalitarian solution for the assignment game (Q435739) (← links)
- Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search (Q456691) (← links)
- Task assignment with controlled and autonomous agents (Q459176) (← links)
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' (Q462856) (← links)
- On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria (Q472191) (← links)
- Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences (Q477355) (← links)
- Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems (Q477777) (← links)
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching (Q485428) (← links)
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (Q485776) (← links)
- Assigning agents to a line (Q485809) (← links)
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets (Q485820) (← links)
- Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion (Q490945) (← links)
- Stability and competitive equilibria in multi-unit trading networks with discrete concave utility functions (Q495853) (← links)
- Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships (Q496871) (← links)
- Existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search frictions (Q500559) (← links)
- Stability with one-sided incomplete information (Q508409) (← links)
- On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games (Q514491) (← links)
