The following pages link to Manipulation via Endowments (Q4197579):
Displaying 46 items.
- Let them cheat! (Q423773) (← links)
- Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium (Q514479) (← links)
- The \(n\)-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations (Q540600) (← links)
- Manipulation by reallocating initial endowments (Q593964) (← links)
- Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent (Q622574) (← links)
- Core is manipulable via segmentation (Q705849) (← links)
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods (Q866940) (← links)
- General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions (Q992053) (← links)
- Existence of equilibrium for Walrasian endowment games (Q1068678) (← links)
- Private information in large economies (Q1083358) (← links)
- Can everyone benefit from growth ? Two difficulties (Q1116868) (← links)
- Are rational expectations really rational? (Q1195092) (← links)
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets (Q1268574) (← links)
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement (Q1283855) (← links)
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets? (Q1294009) (← links)
- The Lindahl solution with changing population and recsources (Q1296481) (← links)
- Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments (Q1342681) (← links)
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets (Q1381985) (← links)
- Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies (Q1385275) (← links)
- A top dog tale with preference complementarities (Q1652838) (← links)
- Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing (Q1728405) (← links)
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation (Q1792571) (← links)
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments (Q1867834) (← links)
- Nash implementation in production economies (Q1893788) (← links)
- Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods (Q1929448) (← links)
- Non-manipulability vs. individual rationality in a permit sharing problem (Q1934101) (← links)
- Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies (Q2016215) (← links)
- Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market (Q2100651) (← links)
- Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing (Q2159522) (← links)
- New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation (Q2247950) (← links)
- Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences (Q2341129) (← links)
- Household formation and markets (Q2354541) (← links)
- Incentives in landing slot problems (Q2359379) (← links)
- Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods (Q2406941) (← links)
- Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information (Q2424242) (← links)
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839) (← links)
- Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments (Q2432489) (← links)
- Coalition-enhancing fiscal policies in an open economy: a CES framework of Gale's transfer paradox (Q2441215) (← links)
- The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies (Q2675439) (← links)
- The Incentive Ratio in Exchange Economies (Q2958354) (← links)
- STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS (Q3444821) (← links)
- Reaching Cournot-Walras Equilibrium (Q4606393) (← links)
- Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments (Q5111104) (← links)
- Implementation Theory (Q5150289) (← links)
- Gradient differences and bilateral barters (Q5169451) (← links)
- Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms (Q6188246) (← links)
