The following pages link to Peter Troyan (Q423771):
Displaying 10 items.
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare (Q423772) (← links)
- Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies (Q1735813) (← links)
- Essentially stable matchings (Q2178028) (← links)
- Obvious manipulations (Q2288530) (← links)
- Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values (Q2359391) (← links)
- OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY‐PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF TOP TRADING CYCLES (Q3299199) (← links)
- Improving matching under hard distributional constraints (Q4682776) (← links)
- School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance (Q4991717) (← links)
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design (Q6536583) (← links)
- (Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms (Q6596162) (← links)
