The following pages link to Patrick W. Schmitz (Q423780):
Displaying 37 items.
- Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment (Q423781) (← links)
- Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted (Q500509) (← links)
- Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments (Q617587) (← links)
- The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule (Q765225) (← links)
- Task scheduling and moral hazard (Q946362) (← links)
- The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures (Q969480) (← links)
- Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining (Q1046356) (← links)
- Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts (Q1292452) (← links)
- Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances. (Q1399530) (← links)
- On second-price auctions and imperfect competition. (Q1415912) (← links)
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems (Q1601456) (← links)
- The negotiators who knew too much: transaction costs and incomplete information (Q1670149) (← links)
- Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs (Q1672867) (← links)
- Hidden action and outcome contractibility: an experimental test of moral hazard theory (Q1753310) (← links)
- Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Q1782397) (← links)
- On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information (Q1851234) (← links)
- Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information (Q1934720) (← links)
- Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (Q1934817) (← links)
- Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework (Q1934941) (← links)
- The management of innovation: experimental evidence (Q2013380) (← links)
- On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries (Q2036920) (← links)
- Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Q2292721) (← links)
- Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership (Q2324693) (← links)
- Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered (Q2343312) (← links)
- Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory (Q2345232) (← links)
- Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach (Q2439808) (← links)
- Investments as signals of outside options (Q2439918) (← links)
- Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (Q2440419) (← links)
- The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability (Q2440456) (← links)
- Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods (Q2444167) (← links)
- Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach (Q2444437) (← links)
- Public procurement in times of crisis: the bundling decision reconsidered (Q2453061) (← links)
- Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: punishment or rent extraction? (Q2695781) (← links)
- Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study (Q4610621) (← links)
- REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY* (Q4619993) (← links)
- Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices* (Q4684788) (← links)
- Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory (Q6047336) (← links)