Pages that link to "Item:Q4262860"

The following pages link to The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I (Q4262860):

Displaying 50 items.

• On the solution of convex bilevel optimization problems (Q263155) (← links)
• An envelope approach to tournament design (Q268598) (← links)
• Relational contracts and the first-order approach (Q268636) (← links)
• Optimal contracts in portfolio delegation (Q317542) (← links)
• Branch-and-sandwich: a deterministic global optimization algorithm for optimistic bilevel programming problems. I: theoretical development (Q480823) (← links)
• Smoothing augmented Lagrangian method for nonsmooth constrained optimization problems (Q496609) (← links)
• Global efficiency for multiobjective bilevel programming problems under generalized invexity (Q513525) (← links)
• Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach (Q523501) (← links)
• Approximating stationary points of stochastic mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints via sample averaging (Q542110) (← links)
• On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending (Q634506) (← links)
• Is bilevel programming a special case of a mathematical program with complementarity constraints? (Q662289) (← links)
• On optimal sharing rules in discrete- and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility (Q673263) (← links)
• Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement (Q694727) (← links)
• A smoothing augmented Lagrangian method for solving simple bilevel programs (Q742311) (← links)
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices (Q753644) (← links)
• Optimal auctions with information acquisition (Q765226) (← links)
• Prevention efforts, insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures (Q784461) (← links)
• Strive to be first or avoid being last: an experiment on relative performance incentives (Q894607) (← links)
• A new class of sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to the principal-agent problem (Q899785) (← links)
• A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model (Q900607) (← links)
• An information inequality for agency problems (Q902648) (← links)
• Pareto improving taxes (Q924930) (← links)
• Moral hazard with bounded payments (Q960243) (← links)
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion (Q980958) (← links)
• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation (Q1001821) (← links)
• Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard (Q1054250) (← links)
• Regulation of a risk averse firm (Q1272618) (← links)
• Incentive contracting with hidden choices of effort and risk (Q1352163) (← links)
• On the optimal taxation of capital income (Q1357422) (← links)
• Asymptotic efficiency in dynamic principal-agent problems (Q1572946) (← links)
• Approximated set-valued mapping approach for handling multiobjective bilevel problems (Q1652037) (← links)
• A modified homotopy method for solving the principal-agent bilevel programming problem (Q1655396) (← links)
• A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system (Q1694340) (← links)
• A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity (Q1727153) (← links)
• The bilevel programming problem: reformulations, constraint qualifications and optimality conditions (Q1949263) (← links)
• Convexification method for bilevel programs with a nonconvex Follower's problem (Q2031936) (← links)
• Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function (Q2068069) (← links)
• A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard (Q2154354) (← links)
• The moral hazard problem with high stakes (Q2173114) (← links)
• Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach (Q2173130) (← links)
• Relaxed constant positive linear dependence constraint qualification and its application to bilevel programs (Q2200089) (← links)
• Mixed-integer bilevel representability (Q2220657) (← links)
• Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions (Q2351244) (← links)
• All-units discounts and double moral hazard (Q2359378) (← links)
• On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach (Q2434228) (← links)
• Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems (Q2437832) (← links)
• Globally convergent homotopy method for designing piecewise linear deterministic contractual function (Q2438397) (← links)
• Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem (Q2439917) (← links)
• On solving simple bilevel programs with a nonconvex lower level program (Q2452381) (← links)
• Difference of convex algorithms for bilevel programs with applications in hyperparameter selection (Q2693651) (← links)