Pages that link to "Item:Q4262864"
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The following pages link to Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts (Q4262864):
Displayed 39 items.
- Incorporating unawareness into contract theory (Q380866) (← links)
- Implementability and equity in production economies with unequal skills (Q497947) (← links)
- Awareness of unawareness: a theory of decision making in the face of ignorance (Q508407) (← links)
- Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments (Q617587) (← links)
- Framing contingencies in contracts (Q631117) (← links)
- Technology driven organizational structure of the firm (Q665834) (← links)
- Non-bossiness (Q682486) (← links)
- Does evolution solve the hold-up problem? (Q700125) (← links)
- Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness (Q707701) (← links)
- Credible implementation (Q863264) (← links)
- Children crying at birthday parties. Why? (Q878403) (← links)
- Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations (Q953686) (← links)
- Decentralization and collusion (Q1277089) (← links)
- Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances. (Q1399530) (← links)
- A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment. (Q1421899) (← links)
- Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999) (Q1592722) (← links)
- Coordination and learning with a partial language (Q1592822) (← links)
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems (Q1601456) (← links)
- Introspective unawareness and observable choice (Q1682712) (← links)
- Does exposure to unawareness affect risk preferences? A preliminary result (Q1706790) (← links)
- A behavioral definition of unforeseen contingencies (Q1753694) (← links)
- Implementing a surplus division rule (Q1928732) (← links)
- Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information (Q1934720) (← links)
- Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage (Q1934773) (← links)
- Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (Q1934817) (← links)
- Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework (Q1934941) (← links)
- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked (Q2268911) (← links)
- Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered (Q2343312) (← links)
- Noncontractible investments and reference points (Q2351241) (← links)
- Limited observability as a constraint in contract design (Q2373781) (← links)
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem (Q2419597) (← links)
- Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach (Q2439808) (← links)
- Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (Q2440419) (← links)
- The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability (Q2440456) (← links)
- Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms (Q2475990) (← links)
- Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms (Q2482920) (← links)
- INFORMATION, RISK SHARING, AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS (Q2980203) (← links)
- INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING (Q3521290) (← links)
- Identifying subjective beliefs in subjective state space models (Q5964689) (← links)