Pages that link to "Item:Q4262865"

The following pages link to Foundations of Incomplete Contracts (Q4262865):

Displaying 31 items.

• Comments on: ``Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications'' (Q526629) (← links)
• Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments (Q617587) (← links)
• Critical decisions and constitutional rules (Q647553) (← links)
• Technology driven organizational structure of the firm (Q665834) (← links)
• Does evolution solve the hold-up problem? (Q700125) (← links)
• Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness (Q707701) (← links)
• Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation (Q894072) (← links)
• Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations (Q953686) (← links)
• Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances. (Q1399530) (← links)
• Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999) (Q1592722) (← links)
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems (Q1601456) (← links)
• Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Q1782397) (← links)
• Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information (Q1934720) (← links)
• Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage (Q1934773) (← links)
• Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (Q1934817) (← links)
• On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries (Q2036920) (← links)
• Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem (Q2099057) (← links)
• On efficient firm formation (Q2203491) (← links)
• Learning in a credit economy (Q2270568) (← links)
• Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Q2292721) (← links)
• Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership (Q2324693) (← links)
• Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered (Q2343312) (← links)
• Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach (Q2439808) (← links)
• Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (Q2440419) (← links)
• The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability (Q2440456) (← links)
• Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms (Q2475990) (← links)
• Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains: a biform-game analysis (Q2514779) (← links)
• Trust management for \(e\)-transactions (Q2571437) (← links)
• Explicating the mediating role of integrative supply management practices in strategic outsourcing: a case study analysis (Q3163759) (← links)
• INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING (Q3521290) (← links)
• A Characterization of Verifiability and Observability in Contracts (Q4567818) (← links)