The following pages link to Ton Storcken (Q516059):
Displayed 50 items.
- An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains (Q516060) (← links)
- Towards an axiomatization of orderings (Q687178) (← links)
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences (Q697846) (← links)
- On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules (Q826632) (← links)
- Oligarchies in spatial environments (Q845604) (← links)
- Measuring polarization in preferences (Q899385) (← links)
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability (Q996393) (← links)
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions (Q997202) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings (Q1196175) (← links)
- Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems (Q1202563) (← links)
- Measuring intransitivity (Q1277476) (← links)
- Decomposable effectivity functions (Q1290123) (← links)
- Effectivity functions and simple games (Q1358637) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces (Q1360946) (← links)
- Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good (Q1365370) (← links)
- Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped (Q1390979) (← links)
- A re-characterization of the Kemeny distance (Q1633666) (← links)
- Locating a public good on a sphere (Q1668030) (← links)
- Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model (Q1680114) (← links)
- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox. (Q1867814) (← links)
- Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems (Q1886747) (← links)
- Effectivity functions and associated claim game correspondences (Q1893375) (← links)
- Impossibilities with Kemeny updating (Q1925716) (← links)
- Update monotone preference rules (Q1940716) (← links)
- Frequency based analysis of collective aggregation rules (Q1985731) (← links)
- An axiomatic re-characterization of the Kemeny rule (Q2088907) (← links)
- Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information (Q2093824) (← links)
- An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule (Q2235101) (← links)
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains (Q2243536) (← links)
- A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness (Q2324698) (← links)
- Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval (Q2325645) (← links)
- A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting (Q2338654) (← links)
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity (Q2385061) (← links)
- Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments (Q2386274) (← links)
- Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc (Q2444435) (← links)
- On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences (Q2447167) (← links)
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules (Q2450082) (← links)
- Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains (Q2452222) (← links)
- Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences (Q2519484) (← links)
- Choice correspondences for public goods (Q2567904) (← links)
- Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences (Q2572440) (← links)
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship (Q2641999) (← links)
- Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules (Q2787396) (← links)
- Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms (Q3135911) (← links)
- Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes (Q3142161) (← links)
- (Q3360641) (← links)
- (Q3470207) (← links)
- Centers in Connected Undirected Graphs: An Axiomatic Approach (Q3637410) (← links)
- (Q3707725) (← links)
- (Q3737130) (← links)