Pages that link to "Item:Q5896619"

The following pages link to On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation (Q5896619):

Displaying 35 items.

• A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction (Q372374) (← links)
• A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation (Q405557) (← links)
• Implementation without rationality assumptions (Q430150) (← links)
• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium (Q694739) (← links)
• Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations (Q709076) (← links)
• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms (Q866939) (← links)
• Nash implementation without no-veto power (Q952763) (← links)
• Interactive implementation (Q1294101) (← links)
• Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems (Q1300409) (← links)
• A new necessary condition for Nash implementation (Q1300507) (← links)
• Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization (Q1363085) (← links)
• Implementation in generalized matching problems (Q1363086) (← links)
• The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium. (Q1408716) (← links)
• On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference (Q1675038) (← links)
• Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals (Q1792573) (← links)
• An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability (Q1814807) (← links)
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications. (Q1867848) (← links)
• Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction (Q1929138) (← links)
• Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability (Q1934848) (← links)
• Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research (Q1982858) (← links)
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (Q2206010) (← links)
• Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked (Q2268911) (← links)
• Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage (Q2318123) (← links)
• Constrained implementation (Q2324814) (← links)
• Double implementation without no-veto-power (Q2334843) (← links)
• Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems (Q2343805) (← links)
• Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization (Q2370493) (← links)
• Divide-and-permute (Q2387317) (← links)
• Implementation in partial equilibrium (Q2397627) (← links)
• Implementation of voting operators (Q2493124) (← links)
• Maskin's theorem with limited veto power (Q2506313) (← links)
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation (Q5906924) (← links)
• An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria (Q5932220) (← links)
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms (Q5943172) (← links)
• Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility (Q6183347) (← links)