The following pages link to Tilman Börgers (Q809909):
Displaying 20 items.
- Upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes (Q809910) (← links)
- Efficient compromising (Q840684) (← links)
- An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly (Q900611) (← links)
- A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types (Q1014325) (← links)
- Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games (Q1121187) (← links)
- (Q1196699) (redirect page) (← links)
- ``Cautious'' utility maximation and iterated weak dominance (Q1196700) (← links)
- Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge (Q1339752) (← links)
- A counterexample to Dhillon (1998) (Q1704053) (← links)
- On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games (Q1804638) (← links)
- When are signals complements or substitutes? (Q1943444) (← links)
- (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007) (Q2318118) (← links)
- Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games (Q2641200) (← links)
- (Q2712325) (← links)
- Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model (Q3989003) (← links)
- (Q4365156) (← links)
- Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules (Q4586099) (← links)
- An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (Q5262530) (← links)
- Pure Strategy Dominance (Q5286050) (← links)
- Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules (Q5473016) (← links)
