Structural econometrics of auctions: a review

DOI10.1561/0800000031MaRDI QIDQ5376217zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Matthew Gentry, Timothy P. Hubbard, Denis Nekipelov, Harry J. Paarsch

Publication date 17 September 2018

Published in Foundations and Trends® in Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1561/0800000031

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsstructural econometrics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Extreme value theory; extremal stochastic processes (60G70) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to statistics (62-02) Order statistics; empirical distribution functions (62G30) Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Structural econometric methods in auctions: a guide to the literature
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5296347

Cited in

(5)

• How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations?
• Monotonicity-constrained nonparametric estimation and inference for first-price auctions
• A functional estimation approach to the first-price auction models
• The role of information in auctions
• The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders

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