Structural estimation of auction models
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cited in
(17)- Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions
- How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations?
- Econometrics of first-price auctions with entry and binding reservation prices
- Structural econometric methods in auctions: a guide to the literature
- How well do selection models perform? Assessing the acuracy of art auction pre-sale estimates
- Empirical models of auctions
- Identification and estimation of a bidding model for electronic auctions
- Econometrics of First-Price Auctions
- Inference from Auction Prices
- Efficient local IV estimation of an empirical auction model
- Piecewise Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimation in Empirical Models of Auctions
- Structural econometrics of auctions: a review
- Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
- Identification of Standard Auction Models
- Preferences and Performance in Simultaneous First-Price Auctions: A Structural Analysis
- An adversarial approach to structural estimation
- Measurement of excess bidding in auctions
This page was built for publication: Structural estimation of auction models
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2735135)
