Technical Note—Traffic Equilibrium Paradoxes

DOI10.1287/TRSC.25.3.240MaRDI QIDQ3356066zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefano Catoni, Stefano Pallottino

Publication date 1991

Published in Transportation Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.25.3.240

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10)

Cited in

(8)

• Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in splittable congestion games
• Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
• On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
• Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
• Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow
• Detecting Braess paradox based on stable dynamics in general congested transportation networks
• Nonadaptive Selfish Routing with Online Demands
• Complexity and parametric computation of equilibria in atomic splittable congestion games via weighted block Laplacians

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