The fixed points of belief and knowledge
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Cites work
- A Kripkean approach to unknowability and truth
- A note on syntactical treatments of modality
- A paradox regained
- Comparing fixed-point and revision theories of truth
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3730106 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3020851 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3073037 (Why is no real title available?)
- Knowledge and belief. An introduction to the logic of the two notions. Prepared by Vincent F. Hendricks and John Symons
- Languages with self-reference. I: Foundations (or: We can have everything in first-order logic!)
- Languages with self-reference. II: Knowledge, belief, and modality
- LogAB: A first-order, non-paradoxical, algebraic logic of belief
- Notes on naive semantics
- On the pure logic of justified belief
- Outline of a Theory of Truth
- Possible-worlds semantics for modal notions conceived as predicates
- Saving truth from paradox
- Some limitations to the psychological orientation in semantic theory
- Thomason's paradox for belief, and two consequence relations
- Truth and paradox
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