A paradox regained

DOI10.1305/NDJFL/1093956549MaRDI QIDQ1131358zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors S. H. Smith, David B. Kaplan, Richard Montague

Publication date 1960

Published in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1093956549

zbMATH Keywords

philosophy and foundations of mathematics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Cited in

(36)

• Epistemic logic for rule-based agents
• Operators in the paradox of the knower
• Paradox and logical revision. A short introduction
• The knower paradox in the light of provability interpretations of modal logic
• There is no paradox of logical validity
• Epistemic logic, monotonicity, and the Halbach-Welch rapprochement strategy
• Some remarks on restricting the knowability principle
• Montague's paradox, informal provability, and explicit modal logic
• A Grim semantics for logics of belief
• Paradoxes of interaction?
• On the existence of a modal antinomy
• Epistemology and artificial intelligence
• One hundred years of semantic paradox
• 2000 European Summer Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic. Logic Colloquium 2000. La Sorbonne, Paris, France, July 23-31, 2000
• Naive truth and naive logical properties
• Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, Stanford, California, 1985
• The paradox of the knower revisited
• Further reflections on sentences saying of themselves strange things
• European Summer Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic
• A solution to the surprise exam paradox in constructive mathematics
• Two paradoxes of semantic information
• Montagovian paradoxes and hyperintensional content
• Metamathematische Begriffe in Standardtheorien
• PROVING UNPROVABILITY
• No future
• A Kripkean approach to unknowability and truth
• Solutions to the knower paradox in the light of Haack's criteria
• Strengthening Consistency Results in Modal Logic
• From the knowability paradox to the existence of proofs
• Non-contractability and revenge
• A liar-like paradox for rational reflection principles
• On the pure logic of justified belief
• The fixed points of belief and knowledge
• A genuinely untyped explanation of common belief and knowledge
• The surprise examination in dynamic epistemic logic
• Transductions in arithmetic

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