Truth and paradox
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(89)- Jump liars and Jourdain's card via the relativized T-scheme
- Two types of deflationism
- How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result
- Some remarks on extending and interpreting theories with a partial predicate for truth
- An axiomatic approach to self-referential truth
- Tarski on ``essentially richer metalanguages
- What the Liar taught Achilles
- What's in a function?
- Quantified Quinean S5
- Property theory: The type-free approach \(v\). The Church approach
- Dynamic semantics and circular propositions
- Non-well-founded sets via revision rules
- A theory of truth that prefers falsehood
- Boolean paradoxes and revision periods
- Unified grounding
- Self-referential propositions
- Possible-worlds semantics for modal notions conceived as predicates
- Alternative revision theories of truth
- Frege's new science
- A contextual-hierarchical approach to truth and the liar paradox
- A system of complete and consistent truth
- A contingent Russell's paradox
- How truth behaves when there's no vicious reference
- Revision without revision sequences: self-referential truth
- Notes on Leitgeb's Ruitenburg
- What paradoxes depend on
- Outline of an intensional theory of truth
- Designing paradoxes: a revision-theoretic approach
- Herzberger's limit rule with labelled sequent calculus
- Comparing more revision and fixed-point theories of truth
- Reference, paradoxes and truth
- Toward a theory of play: a logical perspective on games and interaction
- Cofinally invariant sequences and revision
- Conditionals in theories of truth
- Limits in the revision theory. More than just definite verdicts
- Rethinking revision
- Instability and contraction. \textit{Méditations hégéliennes}. I
- Variations on a Montagovian theme
- One step is enough
- On Gupta-Belnap revision theories of truth, Kripkean fixed points and the next stable set
- From closure games to strong Kleene truth
- Modality and axiomatic theories of truth. I: Friedman-Sheard
- Solovay-type theorems for circular definitions
- Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, Stanford, California, 1985
- A theory of properties
- The truth is never simple
- Annual Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, Pittsburgh, 1991
- Spring Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, San Francisco, 1991
- A theory of truth based on a medieval solution to the liar paradox
- Annual meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, Notre Dame, 1993
- Sets and plural comprehension
- Alternative ways for truth to behave when there's no vicious reference
- Montague's theorem and modal logic
- THE TERNARY DESCRIPTION LANGUAGE AS A FORMALISM FOR THE PARAMETRIC GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY: PART 1
- The anatytic conception of truth and the foundations of arithmetic
- Property theory and the revision theory of definitions
- THE COPERNICAN MULTIVERSE OF SETS
- Extendability and paradox
- Feferman and the Truth
- On the type-free paracoherent foundation of mathematics with the sedate extension of classical logic by the librationist set theory {\textsterling}, and specifically on why {\textsterling} is neither inconsistent nor contradictory nor paraconsistent
- Axiomatizing semantic theories of truth?
- A UNIFIED THEORY OF TRUTH AND PARADOX
- Notes on -inconsistent theories of truth in second-order languages
- PROVING UNPROVABILITY
- Guest editors' introduction
- On meaningfulness and truth
- The elimination of direct self-reference
- Conjunctive paraconsistency
- Procedural semantics and its relevance to paradox
- Gödel, Escher, Bell: contextual semantics of logical paradoxes
- The fixed points of belief and knowledge
- Adequate conditionals and Kripke's theory of truth
- A genuinely untyped explanation of common belief and knowledge
- Reference digraphs of non-self-referential paradoxes
- Some notes on truths and comprehension
- Should theories of logical validity self-apply?
- From paradoxicality to paradox
- The liar without relativism
- Absolute generality and revision theory
- Symmetry groups of Boolean self-referential systems
- Kripke's fixed points and Leitgeb's semantic dependence
- Revision theory without -inconsistency
- A framework for riddles about truth that do not involve self-reference
- Logic of paradox revisited
- A fixed point theorem for the weak Kleene valuation scheme
- Paradox, truth and logic. I. Paradox and truth
- Four valued semantics and the Liar
- What truth depends on
- Periodicity and reflexivity in revision sequences
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