To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control

DOI10.2307/2296911MaRDI QIDQ4153888zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Evan Kwerel

Publication date 1977

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/95b4c93dd6fb68ad2f0055c50db116c6f6724f23

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Cited in

(12)

• Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
• Network pollution games
• Implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects
• A complete implementation of the efficient allocation of pollution
• New results for network pollution games
• AN ITERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
• On the cheating problem in Stackelberg games†
• Environmental regulation in project-based industries
• Pollution control by options trading
• Environmental policy à la carte: letting firms choose their regulation
• Optimal goods production subject to emissions trading with price floor
• Managing partially protected resources under uncertainty

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