Topological aggregation of inequality preorders

DOI10.1007/BF00437312MaRDI QIDQ1067955zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors B. George

Publication date 1985

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00437312

zbMATH Keywords

continuitycontinuous anonymous aggregation ruleinequality preorderstrict Schur-convexityunanimity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Review text

An inequality preorder is defined as a complete preorder on a simplex which satisfies the properties of continuity and strict Schur-convexity (the mathematical equivalent of Dalton's principle of transfers). The paper shows that it is possible to aggregate individual inequality preorders into a collective one if we are interested in a continuous anonymous aggregation rule that respect unanimity. The aggregation problem is studied within a topological framework introduced by \textit{G. Chichilnisky} [Adv. Math. 37, 165-176 (1980; Zbl 0446.90004)].

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Cites work

• Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market
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• Measures of inequality as an aggregation of individual preferences about income distribution: The Arrowian case
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox
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Cited in

(6)

• Measures of inequality as an aggregation of individual preferences about income distribution: The Arrowian case
• Topological structure of a space of continuous preferences as a space of retractions and the aggregation problem
• The Moebius strip and a social choice paradox
• Topological social choice
• Topological Framework for Non‐Priority
• On the robustness of the impossibility result in the topological approach to social choice

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