Understanding dynamic interactions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.10.010MaRDI QIDQ6665655zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Konrad Grabiszewski, Alex R. Horenstein

Publication date 17 January 2025

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2024.10.010

zbMATH Keywords

backward inductionfinite dynamic gamesmobile experimentsolvingtree constructionunderstanding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

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Cites work

• A laboratory investigation of multiperson rationality and presentation effects
• A Typology of Players: Between Instinctive and Contemplative *
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: an experimental study
• Choice theory when agents can randomize
• Clocks and trees: isomorphic Dutch auctions and centipede games
• Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining
• Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist
• Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion
• Endogenous depth of reasoning
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 679839 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning by Doing and the Choice of Technology
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• Order of play in strategically equivalent games in extensive form
• Probabilistic choice (models) as a result of balancing multiple goals
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• The control of game form recognition in experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person ``guessing game
• The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice
• Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem

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