Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAC013MaRDI QIDQ5877765zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kei Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi, Juan Ortner, Sylvain Chassang

Publication date 16 February 2023

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac013

zbMATH Keywords

anti-trustbacklogcollusionincumbencyprocurementregression discontinuity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
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Cited in

(3)

• Robust screens for noncompetitive bidding in procurement auctions
• Clustered bids in first-price auctions: collusion or competition?
• The value of privacy in cartels: an analysis of the inner workings of a bidding ring

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