A dynamical characterization of evolutionarily stable states (Q684773): Difference between revisions

The paper discusses and compares various definitions of stability in evolutionary game theory. In the simplest setting it is assumed that an individual of a given population can display one out of \(n\) different types of behaviour. If \(x_ i\) represents the relative frequency of individuals displaying behaviour \(i\) then the state space evolution is given by a so-called replicator dynamics \(\dot x= f(x)\), where \(x= (x_ 1,\dots,x_ n)\) belongs to the simplex \(S^ n\). Evolutionary stability is defined in terms of Nash equilibrium like conditions on \(x\in S^ n\). Dynamic stability refers to local stability around a fixed point of \(\dot x= f(x)\) as \(t\to\infty\). These two definitions do not coincide; one reason being that \(\dot x= f(x)\) can have many fixed-points. A purely dynamical characterization of evolutionary stability is not available in a straightforward manner and a main objective of the paper is to provide such a characterization. Two other definitions of stability are discussed within this context as well: global and weak dynamical stability. This characterization is achieved by the investigation of so-called ``derived games'' which consist of a game played with respect to the successful states (fixed-points) of the original game. Biological interpretation of the various mathematical results are given. One of the aims of the author's was to provide a unified presentation of both notation and terminology.