A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma (Q1604520): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2774 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 11:33, 4 June 2024

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A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
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    A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma (English)
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    4 July 2002
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    The authors prove the folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. A number of theorems and lemmas are established for sequential equilibrium. It is also stated that the strategies can as well be implemented by finite automata. A nice theoretical paper to read.
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    private monitoring
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    payoffs
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    sequential equilibrium
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