Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case (Q1864800): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 14:09, 5 June 2024

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Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
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    Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case (English)
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    23 March 2003
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    Affiliated-value second-price auctions with two financially constrained bidders are studied. The existence of a symmetric equilibrium is proved under general conditions. Comparative statics results are provided.
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    second price auction
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    affiliated values
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    financially constrained bidders
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