Subscription mechanisms for network formation. (Q1867527): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 13:39, 5 June 2024

scientific article
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Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
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    Subscription mechanisms for network formation. (English)
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    2 April 2003
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    The purpose of this paper is to examine a model of network formation with costs where individual benefits from network formation are not known to the planner. A number of theorems and explanations is made for establishment of the proposed model. No numerical experiments are performed.
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    Networks mechanism
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    model
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    planner
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    payoffs
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